There is a telling fact in Patch Note approved by the Draghi government after the victory of the right. This is the deficit reduction forecast. In the Draghi Shadow Agenda – broken down into forecasts for the future – there was a reduction in the deficit from 11.8 to 3.4% from 2021 to 2023, a true slimming cure of the austerity regime. In 2022, this objective was partially achieved, with the reduction of the ratio to 5.6% due to inflation, the effects of which were however mitigated by the increase in public expenditure with indebtedness, which became difficult to sustain following the decision to the European powerhouse. Bank (ECB) to raise its rates. From now on, the last update made by Mario Draghi after the victory of Giorgia Meloni continues to foresee the reduction in 2023 of the ratio down to 3.4%; therefore a horse treatment which will mean a reduction in expenditure or an increase in income for nearly 40 billion in full rigorous style.
It seems clear then that the next Meloni government will not intend to question European recipes, beyond more or less nationalist declarations. After all, Draghi and Meloni had already drawn the line at the Rimini meeting and Enrico Letta’s hope of mobilizing the European chancelleries against the new right was really misplaced. The future Prime Minister risks being a new Lady iron that turbocapitalism will not want it, perhaps entrusting the chair that belonged to Quintino Sella to a “technician”, an expert in turbocapitalism. From Nadef, among others, a very clear fact emerges. The ECB’s decision to block purchases of public debt securities, starting with the Italian one, has already generated in 2022 an interest account to be paid for the Italian State of 76 billion euros which for the year next year, with interest rates soaring above 4% for ten years, will lead to further significant growth in this public expenditure item, despite the medium-long maturities of our debt.
In a nutshell, it is likely that about 80 to 90 billion euros of interest will be paid again, necessary to meet the placement of the maturing debt of 350 billion and the new for another 100 billion. Consequently, the choice of the ECB obliges the Italian State to pay thirty billion more than the phase of purchase carried out by the ECB itself. This decision, however, will have other negative effects, since it will deprive the Bank of Italy, and therefore to a large extent the State, of the interest that the purchase of the Italian debt securities guaranteed it – making the Bank of Italy a buyer with ECB resources – and because the higher state interest payout will in no way translate into an increase in national income given the small number of Italian savers still involved in guaranteeing our country’s debt.
To be even clearer, the ECB’s choice to stop buying Italian debt will produce a sharp increase in unproductive public spending – that of interest – subtracting 30 or even 40 billion euros more than in 2021 from d other much more relevant positions such as health. social; in practice, an unnecessary doubling of the size of the budget law. But why did the ECB stop its debt purchases? The canonical answers are, in fact, the usual ones: public debt cannot always grow, especially in a phase of inflation which, on the contrary, requires a rise in rates and a contraction in liquidity. They seem to me today truly out of time the answers that we are experiencing and yet the “technical” candidates for the post of Minister of the Economy do not seem at all willing to give up, in fact their technical courses will make them rigorous interpreters of an orthodoxy destined to be, narratively, negated, at least in part, by the Meloni government. Current inflation depends on financial speculation that does not fight by reducing liquidity, with devastating effects on already collapsed economies and on national public debts increasingly essential to counter the growing impoverishment of large sections of the population. population. The way to defeat inflationary financialization is to clear up the anomalous plethora of financial engineering products that have made prices a variable gone wild and largely unhooked from the real economy. To introduce a new monetarist rigor, to limit the action of the European Central Bank, is to jeopardize the social stability of many countries and not to achieve the objective of blocking financial inflation which is now able to continue even without flooding liquidity in recent years, given the huge amount of “short” trades.
If Italy has to face 2023 without having the possibility of resorting to sustainable debt following the choice of the ECB, it is very likely that it will lack the resources to cover at least 40% of the measures necessary to deal with the explosion. bills and trying to adjust salaries to inflation. The government of money, some theoreticians of the past would have said, cannot fail to have a strong political dimension; if the new Meloni government will rely on technicians, it will mean that politics has once again lost out to the search for vestals of Italian accounts to protect against the much-criticized European Commission. After all, politics always and only comes back in the election campaign.
Alessandro Volpi is Professor of Contemporary History at the Department of Political Science at the University of Pisa. It deals with questions relating to the processes of cultural and economic transformation in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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